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Abstract In a recent paper, Clark and Munro (1980)
showed that monopsony processing more than offsets the ef-
fects of open-access in the harvesting sector of a commercial
fishery, and leads to overconservation of the resource. We
show here that this conclusion depends critically on the cost
of capacity and consequent ease of entry and exit from the
harvesting sector. In particular, for low entry and exit speeds
the monopsonist has a high degree of monopoly power and by
depressing the price overconserves the natural resource rela-
tive to the social optimum, while as the adjustment speed ap-
proaches infinity a monopsonist employing a discount rate
equal to the social rate of discount will be induced to behave
optimally from the viewpoint of society. By means of a simu-
lation employing parameters from the Pacific halibut fishery,
we also show that a monopsonist subject to relatively sluggish
entry or exit may reap profits considerably less than the re-
source rents accruing if the resource were optimally managed.
1. Introduction
Beginning W\iYi H. Scott Gordon's (1954) seminal article, a great
deal of effort has been expended in describing the economics of
open-access natural resources such as the fisheries, but almost
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without exception the implicit assumption has been of classical
perfect competition in both the fishedng and processing industry!
However, this is at variance with what in many cases is rec-
ognized as the often monopsonistic character of fish processing
(Crutchfield and Pontecorvo, 1969; Capalbo, 1976; Clark and
Munro, 1980; Eraser, 1980). The effects of monopsony pro-
cessing have been analyzed by Clark and Munro (1980).
As one would expect, monopsony processing to the extent
that it depresses the price paid to the fisherman is a conserva-
tionist force, and thus tends to offset overfishing caused by the
open-access nature of the resource. Clark and Munro in fact
showed that monopsony more than offsets the effects of the ex-
ternality, to such an extent that a monopsony processor em-
ploying the social rate of discount is more conservationist than
is socially optimal. This conclusion is based on the fact that the
perceived cost of harvesting to the monopsonist exceeds the true
social cost given an upward sloped harvesting supply curve.
However, the slope of the long-run fishing supply curve, and
consequently the ability of the monopsonist to depress the price
paid to the fishermen depend critically on the ease of entry and
exit in the competitive fishery. Eor example, frictionless entry
or exit in response to profit changes in the competitive harvesting
sector removes the motive for overconservation, with the result
that a processor employing the social discount rate behaves op-
timally from the viewpoint of society. This results from the fact
that the monopsonist in this case is able only to collect the re-
source rents in the fishery and, in maximizing these rents, max-
imizes total rent for the society. At the other extreme, in a fishery
where exit is blocked, a monopsonist (also employing the social
discount rate) will behave in a manner that is more conserva-
tionist than is socially optimal. In intermediate cases profits are
a combination of resource and monopsony rents. Ironically, if
exit is not completely blocked the monopsonist makes less total
profits in equilibrium with a low-exit speed than a high one;
because the stock cannot be controlled directly the loss of re-
source rents due to overconservation outweighs the monopsony
profits. Some of these cases are illustrated by means of a simu-
lation employing parameters from the Pacific halibut fishery.Monopsony Processing in an Open-Access Fishery 333
The paper is divided into three subsequent parts. The first adds
a constant returns to scale monopsony processing sector to a
dynamic fishery model modified to include the cost of new ca-
pacity and derives the conditions applicable in dynamic equilib-
rium. The second section shows the relationships between the
cost of capacity, speed of entry and exit, equilibrium price and
the resource stock, and the final part offers conclusions.*
2. A Model of Monopsony Processing
We begin with the model of an open-access fishery developed
by Smith (1968, 1969) which assumes free entry and exit into the
fishery but nonrational expectations concerning equilibrium
profits as the result of the externalities inherent in a common
property resource. As usual, the biological growth of the fish
stock ix) is summarized by the relationship
X = Fix, x) = xgix, x)
with
F(0, x) = gix, x) = 0, and gix) > 0 (1)
g'ix) < 0, F"ix) < 0 for 0<x<x
Here x is the equilibrium stock size in the unexploited fishery,
the restrictions on gix) (and Fix)) ensuring a stable solution. A
specific form of the gix) function corresponding to the familiar
logistic relation popularized by Schaefer (1954) further restricts
gi:x) to be linear; this is assumed in the simulations in the fol-
lowing section.
The Schaefer model is also followed with respect to the fishery
production function. Let q and e be catch and effort respectively
per individual fishery boat (which we take to represent a single
firm). The Schaefer production function assumes q/e propor-
tional to the fish stock, so ^ = hxe with h a parameter. Unlike
Clark and Munro (1980) who define effort as comprising the long-
run services of both capital and labor, this specifies per-boat
effort ie) as the services of labor and materials in fishing given334 Kenneth R. Stollery
a fixed number of boats (capital) in the fishery.^ The individual
cost curve of effort in the short-run thus naturally has the usual
convex shape, and for simplicity it is assumed quadratic, i.e.
Cfie) = Co + c,eV2 (2)
with
Cfie) - cie and Cf/e = cje + cie/2.
Although the fisherman's control variable is individual effort,
because we are concerned with processing we shall find it con-
venient to work primarily in terms of catch and stock levels; in
terms of these variables the short-run cost function per boat
becomes
, X) = co + ^ iqlhxf = Co + c'^q^llx"- (3)
with
c\ = cjh^
The parameter co denotes fixed cost, while c\ determines the
slope of the marginal cost curve. With Pf the exvessel price of
unprocessed fish, the short-run profits of a vessel in the har-
vesting sector are
T^fie, x) = Pfhxe - Cfie) (4)
In the long run it is necessary to allow for the possibility of
entry into the fishery. To model entry we follow the neoclassical
theory of investment deriving from the seminal contribution of
Eisner and Strotz (1963), extended by Lucas (1967) among oth-
ers. Unlike McKelvey (1985) who treated investment in the fish-
ery as irreversible, we allow possible disinvestment representing
exit from the fishery in response to a monopsony-caused de-
pressed price for unprocessed fish.Monopsony Processing in an Open-Access Fishery 335
The basis for less than instantaneous entry or exit is the cost
of providing new capacity (a "cost of adjustment" for invest-
ment in real fixed capital) in contrast to relatively cost-free
changes in amounts of effort per boat. In our context this means
an upward-sloped industry supply curve for new boats, of the
sort that Anderson (1982) has recently discussed in the context
of total industry effort. For simplicity we represent this cost of
new capacity by a quadratic function of the change in boat num-
bers (each boat being of fixed size). Assuming for simplicity that
boat capital does not depreciate and that exit and entry are
equally costly, total industry costs of adjusting capacity are
simply
TCk = Ckih)V2 (5)
with the parameter Ck denoting the slope of the supply curve for
new capacity.
The competitive harvesting sector then acts to maximize the
present value of expected future profits net of entry costs or
} - c,ih)V2)dz (6)
/-oo
where hiz) denotes the time derivative in period z > t and p is
the rate of discount, which we assume equal to the social dis-
count rate throughout the paper.
While the competitive industry members can control the rate
of investment and effort per boat, by the nature of the common
property externality they can control neither the stock nor the
hiture unprocessed price. Consequently, their expectations
being by nature myopic, they assume Trfiz) = TTfit) for all z >
t (Berck and Perloff, 1984). Taking the terms with t outside the
integral, the problem for the competitive fishery becomes
/•oo /"oo
maxJc = e^'iTfit) I e~''^niz)dz - e"' I e~'"' Ckihiz))^/2 dz
{e,n} Jt Jt
(7)336 Kenneth R. Stollery
Treating this as a problem in the calculus of variations, the
solution follows the relations
^^ = 0^ dTTf/d, = Pfhx - C'fie) - 0 (8)
d fdJX -p(z-t)
Equation (8) simply equates marginal revenue and marginal cost
of effort at each period, t, or
Pf = C'f^iq,x) =
in terms of the catch rate, q. Inversion of this function then
derives the short-run harvesting supply function per vessel:
qiPf, X) = C'f-\Pf, X) = PfX^/c[ (10)
Investment in the fishery can be derived from equation (9).
Integrating over z gives investment as a function of expected
future profits per boat, i.e.:
hit) = e"' j\-''''nfit)/ckdz (11)
Evaluating further given myopic expectations, this becomes the
familiar "accelerator principle":
hit) = TTfit)/pCk = OLTTfit) (12)
with entry or exit proportional to current profits. The parameter
a = 1/pC/t represents the speed of entry or exit, inversely related
to the discount rate used by firms and to the slope of the marginal
cost ofnew capacity. Ck = 0, for example, denoting an infinitely
elastic supply curve of new boats, implies immediate entry or
exit and a zero profit equilibrium at each instant. Whatever the
value of a, long-run equilibrium where TT/ = 0 drives effort toMonopsony Processing in an Open-Access Fishery 337
FIGURE 1. Harvesting sector equilibria at different levels of the resource
stock.
the minimum point of the average fishing cost curve, where
C'fie) = Cfie)le or C'f^iq, x) = Cfiq, x)lq. From (2) or (3) this
determines equilibrium effort (e* = v'2co/ci) and makes equi-
librium catch per boat iq* = he*x = qox) simply proportional
to the stock of fish. Substitution of q* into (3) then implies a
long-run marginal fishing cost function that is a rectangular hy-
perbola, costs being inversely proportional to the stock with
C'fiq*ix), x) = c'lqo/x. Two harvesting sector equilibria for dif-
ferent values of x are illustrated in Eigure 1.
Following Clark and Munro (1980), the processing sector is
described very simply by assuming constant retums to scale in
processing and, because we wish to focus on monopsony power,
by assuming the processed fish price to be fixed in an intema-
tional market. With the fixed process price, Pp, and average338 Kenneth R. Stollery
processing costs, ACp, processor cash fiow per vessel is iTp =
iP'p - Pf)q with Pf = Pp - ACp, the net marginal revenue in
processing.
Optimal Processing
The optimal management of both processing and harvesting sec-
tors requires control of both q and n to maximize joint harvesting
and processing rents. In this case the raw fish price nets out,
and optimum harvesting and processing are represented by the
solution of
/-oo
max Jo = e~<"{ni'np + TTf) - Cki/2}dt
ii.i} JO (13)
e-'"{niP'p - Cfiq,x) - c,iV2}dt
s.t. X - Fix) - nq h = /(/) (investment) (14)
By assumption the optimal path embodies perfect foresight (ra-
tional expectations and no uncertainty) so expected future rents
equal their realized values. The Hamiltonian for this optimal con-
trol problem is
H = e-'"{ni'np + Ttf) - Cki^l2 + \(F(x) - nq) + 7/} (15)
with \(0 and yit) the costate variables associated with the re-
source and capital constraints. The routine optimal control so-
lution is provided by (14) along with the relations:
dH ^ ,
— = [ndi-np + 'nf)/dq]e-'" = 0^ niP'p - C>, - \) = 0 (16)
dq
— = 7 - C/ti = 7 - c<:« = 0 (17)
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\ = p\ - — = (p - F'ix))X + nC'f, (18)
dH
an
lim Kit)e "P' > 0 lim \it)xit)e-"' = 0 (20)
lim yit)e-'" > 0 lim yit)nit)e-'" = 0. (21)
(—^O
Since i = h = 0 in equilibrium, this implies y* = 0 from (17),
and (16) and (19) then determine the optimum catch q*ix) where
C'fg = Cflq at the minimum point of the average cost curve.
Equilibrium capacity is determined from (14) as n* = Fix)lq*ix)
when i: = 0, given that the transversality conditions (20) require
the long-run solution to lie on the stable saddlepoint branch.
When X.—» 0, (18) becomes the "modified golden rule" relation
for investment in the resource (Clark and Munro, 1980) which
can be rewritten as
diTTp + 'Uf)ldq = 0
= p. (22)
The reward for waiting and allowing growth of the stock, ex-
pressed as the biological retum from stock growth plus the real
increase in fishery rents due to cost decline from increased stock
abundance, must be balanced against the opportunity cost of a
deferred harvest. Notice that because we assume the no depre-
ciation, optimum equilibrium stock is independent of Ck, the
slope of the supply curve for new capacity.
Long-Run Competition in Both Sectors
Competition in harvesting drives TT/ to zero in the long-run, so
h = 0 and q = q*ix) at minimum average harvesting cost. Com-
petition in processing will do the same for TT^, and since average
equals marginal processing cost by assumption, this implies
Pp = Pp - ACp = Pf = C'fgix) = c'iqoix, evaluated at q =340 Kenneth R. StoUery
q*ix). Stock decline must continue to the point where minimum
average harvesting plus processing cost equals the processed
price. As is well known, this competitive common property equi-
librium represents overexploitation of the resource.
Monopsony Processing
In this case, employing the social rate of discount, p, the present
value of processing profits alone is
J = JJ e-^'iP'p - Pj)nq dt (23)
maximized s.t. x = F(x) - nq,h = a{Pfq - Cf) and q = q{Pf,
x). The Hamiltonian for this two-state variable control problem
is
H = e-<"{(P;, - Pf)nq + \ixg(x) - nq)
- CM, x))] (24)
with X. and -y the costate variables associated with the resource
and capital constraints. Maximizing H with respect to the control
variable Pf gives the condition:
P'p - 2Pf + a-^Pfln - \ = 0 (25)
This represents the optimum for a static monopsony, that MRQ
= P'p = MCQ = IPf, adjusted for the resource and entry con-
straints.^ The time paths of the capital and resource stock
shadow prices now follow the relations:
^ n -^ 7 = P7 - qiP'p - Pf - >^) (26)
=-i(.e-)-.. (27,
= (p - F'{x))\ + a-iC'f, - n{P'p - Pf - \)dqldxMonopsony Processing in an Open-Access Fishery 341
The transversality conditions applicable with an infinite horizon,
that limt^ooXxe'"' = lim,-^r.yne~'" = 0, again ensure that the
profit-maximizing solution with nonzero stocks is on the stable
saddlepoint branch. When 7 = 0,7* is again the discounted value
of a fishing vessel to the processor, although in this case
7* > 0. When \ = 0, the value of an extra unit of the resource
stock is the value of the extra per-vessel catch it allows and,
indirectly, the effect of reduced harvesting costs on total catch
through entry into the fishery. Combining (25), (26), and (27) in
equilibrium (\ = 7 = 0) reduces the resource stock relation (27)
to the following function of x:
n{x){2pn(x)/x -
x\,W t W + (p, ^,-)
= 0
(28)
For comparison, the stock relation for the optimal fishery written
in equivalent form is (29) below, while (30) results from an in-
dustry that is competitive in both sectors.
F'(x) - ^^ - p = 0 (29)
Pp - ^fq
P'p - C}, = 0 (30)
In the following section, we compare the equilibrium resource
stock under monopsony with that resulting from competitive and
optimal processing.
3. Monopsony and Resource Conservation
It is instructive to focus on the role of entry represented by the
slope of the supply curve for new capacity, Ck indirectly deter-
mining the degree of exploitation possible on the part of the
monopsony. This degree of exploitation determines the equilib-
rium landed price and, indirectly, the level of the stock in com-
parison with the competitive and optimum levels.342 Kenneth R. Stollery
Case I: Ck ^ 0 and a ^ oo (horizontal supply curve of new
capacity)
Taking the limit of \\)ix) as a -^ <» reduces it to lim^^^ \\i = F'{x)
- nC'fJiPp - C'fg) - p = 0, vi'hich can be seen to be identical
to (29), implying that a monopsonist employing the social dis-
count rate will behave optimally. Because of the disappearance
of the ability to exploit the fishery when the exit of capacity is
costless, the monopsonist in effect behaves as if to maximize
resource rent for both fishery and processing sector. Of course,
if the monopsonist discount rate exceeds the social rate of dis-
count, then even if exit is rapid monopsony will be no guarantee
of conservation.
Case II: a—*0 (vertical supply curve of new capacity)
At the opposite extreme v^hen exit from the fishery is blocked
(as the result of industry-specific capital equipment, for example)
the landed price can be driven below the optimal level. Although
profits for the competitive sector are always zero in equilibrium,
the extent to which the purchase price can be driven down de-
pends on the long-run elasticity of supply, in turn depending on
the speed of entry and exit from the fishery. As a ->• 0 i|;(;c)
reduces to
= F'(x) - ^^"^^-^^/^ - p = 0 (31)
q{x, Pf)n = Fix)
which is neither the function representing the competitive (30)
nor the optimal solution (29). The equilibrium solution of course
now depends on the number of firms (because entry no longer
reduces per-boat catch {q) to a simple function of x) but we show
by simulation (below) that for n = n* (the optimum number of
firms) a monopsony with fixed n will overconserve the resource."*
Intermediate Cases
Because the extent of monopsony overconservation depends on
the exit speed, we employ a simple simulation to illustrate theMonopsony Processing in an Open-Access Fishery 343
sensitivity of the equilibrium stock to changes in positive and
finite values of Ck (or a). The parameters employed are derived
from a recent study of the Pacific halibut fishery to Cook (1983),
the halibut fishery being both a relatively simple one and one
with fairly reliable sources of data.
Although Pacific halibut is an international fishery, we employ
parameters from Area 2, for the most part representing the Ca-
nadian sector. According to the regulatory body,^ the average
yield from 1968-1980 in Area 2 was 137*10^ lb. (g). Using data
for the size of the stock Cook (1983, p. 7) has estimated param-
eters for the Verhulst or logistic growth equation for this fishery.
This widely used growth function sets gix) = (3(^ - x), esti-
mating the growth rate of the stock to be a linear function of the
stock size, x represents the maximum equilibrium stock without
fishing and was estimated at Jc = 1096.4*10^ lb. The p estimate
over the 1968-1980 period was p = 5.29*10"^
Price and cost information was obtained by Cook from a Ca-
nadian Department of Fisheries analysis of the Canadian Pacific
halibut fishery in 1978 (MacKay and Mcllroy, 1979). Using these
data Cook (1983) estimated average cost per pound of yield to
be .33 1961 dollars in 1978, which was assumed to represent an
open-access equilibrium as limited entry licensing was estab-
lished in 1979. The real halibut price varied from a low of $.14
per pound in 1938 to $.98 in 1979 with an average of $.39, rea-
sonably close to the average cost estimate. We have therefore
assumed the competitive equilibrium to occur at Pp - ACp =
Pf' = ACf = MCf = $.40 1961 dollars for the simulations we
report.^
The other model parameters were calibrated as follows: with
the growth function above a yield of Q = 137.0*10' lb. implied
an open-access equilibrium stock of x* = 344.4*10' lb..^
C'f^iq*ix), x) = dqolx = Pf = $.40 then determined c'^qo =
$137.75. According to the Catch Summary Report of the Ca-
nadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans there were 127 boats
in the regular halibut fleet in 1980, which in the absence of evi-
dence for monopsony processing in halibut was taken to rep-
resent the competitive processing equilibrium. Q* = nq*ix) =
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benchmark competitive and simulated optimum solutions are
shown as the first and second lines in Table 1.^ As expected, a
competitive processing industry results in excessive boat num-
bers at depressed per-boat yields relative to the optimum as well
as dissipation of the nearly $3 million resource rent within the
fishery. The net landed price is bid above the social optimum
by processors who are constrained by competition from being
able to extract the rent from the fishery (see note 3). The result
is an equilibrium competitive industry resource stock that is less
than one-third of the unexploited stock (jc = 1096.4*10^), and
less than half the optimum equilibrium stock size.
Monopsony processor equilibria for different values of the
speed of adjustment parameter are shown in the latter part of
the table. For very low Ck and large a the monopsony equilibrium
stock, landed price, and catch size approach the optimum so-
lution, a finding that confirms our theoretical result. As the exit
speed from the industry declines, however, there are confiicting
forces operating on the processor cash fiow. The processor is
able to lower the landed price below the competitive equilibrium,
extracting a combination of resource rent and monopsony profit;
as evidenced by rising profit per boat (iVp). This is possible in
equilibrium because conservation of the stock lowers average
harvesting cost. However, as the monopsony operates in an open
access fishery and can control the stock and vessel numbers only
indirectly through its fishermen agents, the resource rent is for
the most part still dissipated; the degree of its collection by the
monopsony depending on the a parameter. Higher a represents
greater control over the level of n and, indirectly, over the re-
source stock, allowing the monopsony to collect more of the
rents. Lower a means greater monopsony power through less
mobility in and out of the fishery (higher cj, increasing mon-
opsony profits but lowering resource rents by overconserving
the stock.' It is this case that Clark and Munro (1980) analyzed,
showing that it results from the monopsony perceiving its mar-
ginal harvesting cost above social marginal cost.
Analysis of the equilibrium when cic—*°° and a = 0 depends
on the chosen value of n. Values of n equal to the optimal n*
for p = .05 and .1 have been chosen for comparison. With nMonopsony Processing in an Open-Access Fishery 347
Table 2

















































Source: Catch Sutnmary Report, Halibut, Department of Fisheries
and Oceans, Vancouver, Data Obtained under Science Subvention Pro-
gramme Grant to Dr. Parzival Copes, Institute of Fisheries Analysis,
Simon Fraser University. Used with permission,
° Include only licensed boats whose catch in each year was 80 percent
or more halibut,
* Average capital value for each year deflated by B. C, Non-Resi-
dential Construction Price Index 1971 = 100 from SC 11-003,
fixed at these optimal values it is clear that the landed price can
be depressed below both competitive and optimal levels, again
resulting in too little effort expended by fishermen and under-
utilization ofthe resource.'"
Some idea concerning the relevant value of c^ and a in the
halibut fishery can be obtained by looking at entry and exit for
that fishery in recent years. Statistics for the regular halibut fieet
in the Canadian sector (area 2b by the International Pacific Hal-
ibut Commission designation) are shown in Table 2. Inspection
ofthe table reveals no clear relationship between the rate of entry
into the regular halibut fieet and the cost of vessel capacity de-
spite higher capital costs in recent periods." The market for new
fishing vessels is certainly thin in Canada (there are under a
dozen fishing boats built each year in the whole country, ac-
cording to estimates from Statistics Canada, Shipbuilding and
Repair) but this does not represent a significant entry constraint
for a particular fishery. First, in the halibut fishery at least there348 Kenneth R. Stollery
has recently been significant excess capacity, as evidenced by
82 licensed vessels that did not fish in 1979, for example.'^ Sec-
ondly, although longline gear is used by the regular halibut fleet,
there are in addition numerous multispecies trollers operating on
a part-time basis; in fact 243 part-time craft took some halibut
in 1980. This suggests relatively costless entry and exit for this
fishery in the absence of government regulation, and indicates,
even if there were a degree of monopsony processing, that the
stock would not be underutilized.
4. Conclusion and Policy Relevance
Clark and Munro (1980) showed that the presence of monopsony
in the processing sector of a fishery more than offsets the effects
of the common property externality in harvesting, causing the
monopsony to overconserve the resource. We have qualified
their result to show that the extent of overconservation depends
critically on the speed of entry or exit in the harvesting sector,
a rapid speed of adjustment inducing the monopsonist to behave
in a less conservationist manner. The presence of monopsony
processing alone, therefore, cannot be taken as an indication that
regulatory attention is unnecessary from the standpoint of con-
servation. While it has been shown that rapid entry or exit in
the fishery sector will induce a monopsonist employing the social
rate of discount to behave optimally, the combination of rapid
entry and a high discount rate will lead to underconservation of
the resource. This point is illustrated by the history of the Pacific
halibut fishery. In that fishery, limited entry licensing was im-
posed in 1979 largely as the result of an exogenous increase in
the entry speed of the fishery. Prior to that time the fishery had
been for the most part a traditional one with boats handed down
through families within a well-defined ethnic and cultural group
of Norwegian fishermen. This was upset in the 1970s by entry
of fishermen who had been unemployed by limited entry licen-
sing designed to preserve threatened salmon stocks. The re-
sulting disruption of both traditional relationships with fish pro-
cessors and of the self-imposed conservation measures
(voluntary lay-up periods) in the halibut fishery increased har-Monopsony Processing in an Open-Access Fishery 349
vesting to such an extent that authorities began to regulate entry
in this fishery as well.
Notes
1. I am indebted to three anonymous referees for comments which
much improved the paper.
2. The analysis of individual boat effort employed in this paper is
similar to that found in Anderson (1976).
3. In an optimally managed processing industry, Pf = Pp - \*,
while of course in competition Pf = Pp.
4. When n is fixed the monopsony is prevented from setting
Pf = Ohy the reduction in per-boat effort that results from lower Pf.
The short mn supply curve is <2 = nPfX^/c'i.
5. The regulatory body for the fishery is the International Pacific
Halibut Commission, which has conducted management jointly by Can-
ada and the United States since 1923.
6. Values from $.25 to $1.00 were employed in sensitivity analysis
without qualitatively affecting the restilts.
7. The quadratic equation ^x(x - x) = Q = 137.4*10' (with p =
5.29*10-^) has the dual roots Xi = 344.4*10' and X2 = 752.0*10'. The
lower root must be the solution given open access to the fishery.
8. Simulations were performed in Fortran employing an Interna-
tional Mathematics and Statistics Software Library program to find the
positive roots ofthe nonlinear equations (29) and (30). Where multiple
roots occurred the root that maximized m^p was picked.
9. Unlike a conventional stock adjustment model, a is not a pro-
portion but depends on the units for n and q etc., as it represents the
effect of fishery profits on boat numbers, a = 1, for example, implies
one boat enters or exists the industry for every ± $100,000 profit in
fishing and thus implies fairly slow adjustment. Put another way, since
Ck = 1/pa, a = 1 with p = .10 indicates each additional boat entering
the fishery raises the marginal cost of vessel capacity by $10,000 as
Mck = lOh measured in $1000.
10. It would of course profit the monopsonist to be able to control
boat numbers as well as the price of fish, for in that case the landed
price could be depressed even further and the monopsonist could col-
lect all resource rent. It can be shown that the profit-maximizing price
in this case derives from Pp - k - IPf = 0 (when -7 = 0) with n set
as large as possible. Something approximating this may occur through
the mechanism of boat leasing, where fishermen do not own their boats.350 Kenneth R. Stollery
11. The inflation of capital values may have resulted from the im-
position of limited-entry licensing in 1979.
12. These and subsequent data were obtained from the Catch Sum-
mary Report, Fisheries and Oceans, Vancouver.
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